We study the performance of anonymous posted-price selling mechanisms for a standard Bayesian auction setting, where n bidders have i.i.d. valuations for a single item. We show that for the natural class of Monotone Hazard Rate (MHR) distributions, offering the same, take-it-or-leave-it price to all bidders can achieve an (asymptotically) optimal revenue. In particular, the approximation ratio is shown to be 1 + O(ln ln n/ ln n), matched by a tight lower bound for the case of exponential distributions. This improves upon the previously best-known upper bound of e/(e − 1) ≈ 1.58 for the slightly more general class of regular distributions. In the worst case (over n), we still show a global upper bound of 1.35. We give a simple, closed-form description of our prices which, interestingly enough, relies only on minimal knowledge of the prior distribution, namely just the expectation of its secondhighest order statistic.
Introduction
In this paper we study a traditional Myersonian auction setting: an auctioneer has an item to sell and he is facing n potential buyers. Each buyer has a (private) valuation for the item, and these valuations are i.i.d. according to some known continuous probability distribution F . You can think of this valuation, as modelling the amount of money that the buyer is willing to spend in order to get the item. An auction is a mechanism that receives as input a bid from each buyer, and then decides if the item is going to be sold and to whom, and for what price. Our goal is to design auctions that maximize the seller's expected revenue.
We focus only on truthful auctions, that is, selling mechanisms that give no incentives to the bidders to lie about their true valuation. Such auctions are both conceptually and practically convenient. This restriction is essentially without loss for our revenue maximization objective, due to the Revelation Principle 1 .
In general, such an optimal auction can be rather complicated and even randomized (aka a lottery). However, in his celebrated result, Myerson [28] proved that (under some standard assumptions on the valuations' distribution) revenue maximization can be achieved by a very simple deterministic mechanism, namely a second-price auction paired with a reserve value r. In such an auction, all buyers with bids smaller than r are ignored and the item is sold to the highest bidder for a price equal to the second-highest bid (or r, if no other bidder remains).
Related Work
The seminal reference in auction theory is the work of Myerson [28] who completely characterized the revenue-maximizing auction in single-item settings with bidder valuations drawn from independent (but not necessarily identical) distribution. Under his standard regularity condition (see Footnote 4) , this optimal auction has a very simple description when the valuation distributions are identical: it is a second-price auction with a reserve. Furthermore, there is an elegant, closed-form formula that gives the reserve price (see Section 2) .
One can achieve good, constant approximations to that optimal revenue by using even simpler auctions, namely anonymous pricing mechanisms. These mechanisms offer the same take-it-or-leave-it price to all bidders, and the item is sold to someone who can afford it (breaking ties arbitrarily). An upper bound of e/(e − 1) ≈ 1.58 on the approximation ratio of anonymous pricing can be shown from the work of Chawla et al. [14] . Blumrosen and Holenstein [10] study the asymptotic performance of pricing when the number of bidders grows large and demonstrate a lower bound on the approximation ratio of 0.88/0.65 = 1.37 for anonymous pricing 2 . If we allow for non-continuous distributions that have point-masses, then Dütting et al. [18] provide a matching lower bound of e/(e − 1). Although the class of MHR distributions (see Section 2) is a natural restriction of Myerson's regularity, that has been extensively studied in optimal auction theory, mechanism design and complexity to derive powerful positive results (see, e.g., [6, 9, 12, 16, 17, 20, 21, 25] ), no better bounds are known for anonymous pricing in this class. This is our goal in this paper.
Although not immediately related to our model, an important line of work studies the performance of "simple" auctions, such as pricing and auctions with reserves, for the more general case where bidders' valuations may be non-identically distributed. In such settings, the elegance of Myerson's characterization is not in effect any more, and the optimal auction 2 As a matter of fact, one can use the techniques of Blumrosen and Holenstein [10] to get a slightly better lower bound of (at least) 1.4: a corollary of their work is that, for any k > 1, if the valuations are drawn from a Pareto distribution with cdf F (x) = 1 − 1/x k and the number of bidders grows arbitrarily large, then the separation between the optimal revenue and that of anonymous pricing is Γ
where Γ is the standard gamma function and η(k) is the unique positive solution of equation e x = 1 + k · x. Optimizing this ratio over k ∈ (1, 2), we can get a lower bound greater than 1.403.
can be rather complicated. Nevertheless, in an influential paper, Hartline and Roughgarden [25] showed that, for regular distributions, a second-price auction with a single anonymous reserve guarantees a 4-approximation to the optimal ratio, and also provided a lower bound of 2. This upper bound was subsequently improved to e ≈ 2.72 by Alaei et al. [3] , achieved even by the simpler class of anonymous pricing mechanisms. At the same paper, they also provided a lower bound of 2.23 for the approximation ratio of anonymous pricing for non-i.i.d. bidders. 3 For bounds on the approximation ratios between different pricing and reserve mechanisms, under various assumptions on the underlying distributions and the order of the bidders' arrival, see [3, 14, 18, 24, 26] .
Finally, we briefly mention that there is a very rich theory about sequential pricing that deals with dynamically arriving buyers and which is inspired by and related to secretary-like online problems and the powerful theory of prophet inequalities. See, e.g., [2, 13, 15, 23, 27, 30 ].
Our Results
In this paper we study the performance of anonymous pricing mechanisms in single-item auction settings with n bidders that have i.i.d. valuations from the same MHR distribution F . These mechanisms are extremely simple: the seller simply offers the same take-it-or-leave-it price p to all potential buyers; the item is then sold to a buyer that can meet this price, that is, has a valuation greater or equal than p; the winning bidder pays p to the seller. Our benchmark is the seller's expected revenue (with respect to his incomplete, prior knowledge of the buyers' bids via distribution F ) and we compare against the maximum revenue achievable by any auction. For our particular model, this optimal auction is a second-price auction with a reserve [28] .
Our main result (Section 5; see also Fig. 1 ) is an explicit, closed-form upper bound on the approximation ratio of the revenue of anonymous pricing. As the number n of buyers grows large, this ratio tends to the optimal value of 1, at a rate of 1 + O(ln ln n/ ln) (Theorem 1). Additionally, we design an upper bound that is fine-tuned to handle also small values of n (Theorem 2), and using this we provide a global, worst-case (with respect to n) upper bound of 1.35 on the approximation ratio. Previously, only an upper bound of e/(e − 1) ≈ 1.58 was known (for any value of n), holding for the slightly more general class of regular distributions.
In Section 7 we demonstrate how the aforementioned positive guarantee on the revenue of anonymous pricing can still be (within an exponentially decreasing additive constant) achieved even if the seller does not have full knowledge of the prior distribution F (see Fig. 2 ). In particular (Theorem 4), we give an explicit formula for such a "good" pricing rule that only depends on the expectation of the second-highest order statistic of F .
Finally, in Section 6 we prove that our upper bound analysis is essentially tight, by showing that the exponential distribution provides an (almost) tight gap instance between the revenue of anonymous pricing and that of the optimal auction (Theorem 3; see also Fig. 2) .
Our upper bound technique differs from related previous approaches [3, 14] in that we do not use the ex-ante relaxation of the revenue-maximization objective. Instead, we deploy explicit upper bounds on the optimal revenue (Section 3) that depend on key parameters of the valuation distribution F , namely its order statistics and its monopoly reserve. Then, we pair these with a range of critical properties of MHR distributions that we develop in Section 4. We believe that some of these auxiliary results may be of independent interest, in particular the order statistics tail-bound of Lemma 3 and the reserve-quantile optimal revenue bound of Lemma 4.
Model and Notation
A seller wants to sell a single item to n ≥ 2 bidders. The valuations of the bidders for the item are i.i.d. from a continuous probability distribution supported over an interval D F ⊆ [0, ∞), with cdf F and pdf f . Throughout this paper we will assume that F has Monotone Hazard Rate (MHR) , that is,
is monotonically nondecreasing with respect to x ∈ D F . Equivalently, this means that ln(1 − F ) is a concave function. The MHR condition is a slight refinement of Myerson's standard regularity condition 4 that is still general enough to give rise to a wide family of natural distributions, like the uniform, exponential, normal and gamma. Intuitively, MHR distributions have exponentially decreasing tails. For an in-depth treatment of MHR distributions we refer to the book of Barlow and Proschan [8, Chapter 2] .
For a random variable X ∼ F drawn from F and 1 ≤ k ≤ n, we will use X k:n to denote the k-th lowest order statistic out of n i.i.d. draws from F . That is, X 1:n ≤ X 2:n ≤ · · · ≤ X n:n . For completeness and ease of reference, we discuss some useful properties of order statistics in Appendix A. The exponential distribution will play a significant role in some parts of our paper; we denote it by E, and its cdf and pdf are F E (x) = 1 − e −x and f E = e −x , respectively. Finally, we use H n to denote the n-th harmonic number H n = n i=1 1 i , and γ ≈ 0.577 for the Euler-Mascheroni constant (see also Lemma 8) .
A pricing mechanism that offers a take-it-or-leave-it price of p ∈ D F to all bidders gives to the seller an expected revenue of
since the probability of no bidder being able to afford price p is F n (p). We will refer to such a mechanism simply as (anonymous) pricing. Thus, the optimal (maximum) revenue achievable via pricing is
On the other hand, as discussed in the introduction, the optimal revenue attainable by any mechanism may be higher; as a matter of fact, Myerson [28] showed that it is achieved by a second-price auction with a reserve equal to the monopoly reserve r * = argmax r∈D F r(1 − F (r)) of the valuation distribution. We denote this optimum revenue by Myerson(F, n), and it can be shown that
is the virtual valuation function of F (see also Footnote 4) and X n:n its maximum order statistic. Keep in mind that, due to the monotonicity of φ and the definition of the reserve r * , we know that φ(x) ≥ 0 for all x ≥ r * .
Sometimes it is more convenient to work in quantile space instead of the actual valuation domain. More precisely, the quantile of distribution F corresponding to a value x ∈ D F is q(x) = 1 − F (x). Using this, we can define what is known as the revenue curve of distribution F , by R(q) = F −1 (1 − q) · q. In other words, if p ∈ D F is a price and q is its corresponding quantile, then R(q) is the expected revenue of selling the item to a single bidder, using a price p. Thus, the monopoly reserve quantile q * that corresponds to the monopoly reserve r * defined above is exactly the maximizer of the revenue curve R(q). So, for a single bidder (n = 1):
4 Regularity a la Myerson [28] requires the virtual valuation
to be nondecreasing. Notice that this is a (strictly) weaker condition than MHR. For example, some Pareto distributions ∝ x −α with α ≥ 2 are regular but not MHR.
In general though for more players (n ≥ 2) this is not the case, and our goal in this paper is exactly to study how well the optimal revenue Myerson(F, n) can be approximated by pricing Price(F, n). That is, we want to bound the following approximation ratio:
Finally, we need to define an auxiliary function that will help us with stating and proving our main results. For any positive integer n, we define the function g n : [0, ∞) −→ [0, ∞) with
Some properties of this function, that will be very useful to us in the following, are proven in Appendix C.
Bounds on the Optimal Revenue
In this section we collect the bounds on the optimal revenue Myerson(F, n) that we will use for our main result in Section 5 to bound the approximation ratio of pricing. They rely on the fact that the valuation distribution is MHR. The first one is essentially a refinement of the well-known Bulow-Klemperer bound [11] , and it was proven by Fu et al. [19] :
Lemma 1 (Fu et al. [19]). For n bidders with i.i.d. values from an MHR
where X ∼ F and R is the revenue curve of F and q * is the quantile corresponding to the monopoly reserve price r * of F , q * = 1 − F (r * ).
Our second bound on the optimal revenue is a new one, that might also be of independent interest for future work: Lemma 2. For every MHR distribution F with monopoly reserve price r * and quantile q * = 1 − F (r * ), and any positive integer n,
Proof. Fix an MHR distribution F , with monopoly reserve price r * and corresponding quantile q * . Then, we know that for the virtual valuation (see Section 2) it is
Also, from the MHR condition, for any x ≥ r * it must be that
.
Combining the above we get that, for all x ≥ r * ,
Fix also a positive integer n, and let X ∼ F . Then (see also Appendix A) the maximum order statistic X n:n is distributed according to F n . Observe that (see also Section 2)
and thus
Also, due to (2), for all x ≥ r * :
By performing a change of variable to quantile space, that is setting z = 1 − F (x) and observing that d z d x = −f (x) and 1 − F (r * ) = q * , we get that
Thus,
Properties of MHR Distributions
In this section we state some properties of MHR distributions that will play a critical role into deriving our main results in the rest of the paper. The first in particular, Lemma 3, might be of independent interest, since it is providing powerful tail-bounds on with respect to the order statistics of the distribution:
Lemma 3. For any continuous MHR random variable
Proof. Let E denote an exponential random variable and also define Y = cX k:n . Let F , G and G Y denote the (cumulative) probability functions of X, X k:n and Y , respectively. Then (see also Appendix A)
for almost all y ∈ [0, ∞). To simplify notation, also let µ = c E[
. Our goal then is to upper-bound F (µ), i.e. lower-bound 1 − F (µ). Since F is MHR, ln(1 − F (x)) is a concave function of x, and so from Jensen's inequality
the third equality holding due to (3), the fifth by performing the change of variable t = − ln(1 − u), and the last one from Appendix A. So, applying the exponential function on both sides, finally we get the desired 1 − F (µ) ≥ e −c(Hn−H n−k ) .
The next lemma states some useful bounds on the monopoly reserve of an MHR distribution:
Lemma 4. For any MHR distribution with expectation µ, monopoly reserve r * and corresponding quantile q * : For the second property, applying [7, Corollary 3.10] for the first-order moments (r = 1), we get that for any quantile q = 1 − F (x) of our MHR distribution with q ≥ 1/e, it must be that
By the first property of our lemma, it is valid to use the above inequality with for the monopoly reserve quantile q * = 1 − F (r * ) and so, by setting q ← q * and x ← r * we have that The upper bounds on the approximation ratio APX(F, n) of anonymous pricing for n i.i.d. bidders with MHR valuations, given by Theorem 1 (blue) and Theorem 2 (red). The best (smallest) of the two converges to the optimal value of 1 as the number of bidders grows large, at a rate of 1 + O (ln ln n/ ln n). A single, unified plot of this can be seen in Fig. 2 (black), together with a matching lower bound (red). In the worst case (n = 3), our upper bound is at most 1.354.
Finally, the following lemma shows that the high-order statistics of MHR distributions are "well-behaved", in the sense that they cannot be away from the expectation:
Lemma 5. For any MHR random variable X and integer n ≥ 2,
Proof. For convenience denote µ = E[X] and ν = E[X n−1:n ]. From Babaioff et al. [6, Lemma 5.3] we know that, since X is MHR, its highest-order statistic is upper bounded by
Using this we get that:
Upper Bounds
This section is dedicated to proving the main result of our paper. First (Theorem 1) we show that pricing is indeed asymptotically optimal with respect to revenue and then (Theorem 2) we also provide a more refined upper-bound on the approximation ratio that is fine-tuned to work well for a small number of bidders n. As we will see in the following Section 6, our upper bound analysis of this section is essentially tight (see also Fig. 2 ).
Theorem 1. Using the same take-it-or-leave-it price, to sell an item to n buyers with i.i.d. valuations from a continuous MHR distribution F , is asymptotically optimal with respect to revenue. In particular,
A plot of the exact values 6 of this upper bound can be seen in Fig. 1 (blue) .
Proof. First notice that by using the monopoly reserve price r * of F as a take-it-or-leave it price to the n bidders, we get an expected revenue of
where q * = 1 − F (r * ) is the quantile of the monopoly reserve price, for which we know that q * ≥ 1 e (Lemma 4), and R denotes the revenue curve (see Section 2). Next, for simplicity denote ν = E [X n−1:n ]. For any real c ∈ [0, 1], if we offer a price of c · ν we have
the inequality holding due to Lemma 3 (for k = n − 1). Optimizing with respect to c we get that
Using the two lower bounds (4) and (6) on the pricing revenue, in conjunction with the upper bound on the optimal revenue from Lemma 1 we can bound the approximation ratio of pricing by
Equation (8) holds by observing that function x →
n is decreasing over (0, 1], for any n ≥ 2, and taking into consideration that q * ≥ 1/e, while for (9) we make use of the asymptotics from Lemma 12. The upper bound given by (8) is plotted by the blue line in Fig. 1 .
Theorem 2. The approximation ratio of the revenue obtained by using the same take-it-orleave-it price, to sell an item to n buyers with i.i.d. valuations from a continuous MHR distribution F , is at most
In particular, the worst case (maximum) of this quantity is attained at n = 3 and is at most APX(F, 3) ≤ 1.354. A plot of the exact values of this upper bound can be seen in Fig. 1 (red) .
Proof. From (7) in the proof of Theorem 1 we can get the following upper bound on the approximation ratio, by using (possibly suboptimally) x ← H n − 1 for the maximization operator:
On the other hand, using the reserve price of F as a price and combining the guarantee of (4) with the upper bound on the optimal revenue from Lemma 2, gives us
since R(q * ) = r * q * . Recalling that q * ∈ [1/e, 1] and taking the best (i.e., minimum) of the two bounds above, finishes the proof.
Lower Bound
The lower bound instance of this section (Theorem 3) shows that our main positive result for the approximation ratio of pricing under MHR distributions in Theorem 1 is essentially tight (see also Fig. 2 ). It is achieved by an exponential distribution instance. Before proving it, we need the following auxiliary lemma about the maximizers of functions g n that we introduced in (1). Its proof can be found in Appendix C. (1) ) has a unique maximizer. Furthermore, for all n ≥ 17, argmax
Lemma 6. For any positive integer n, function g n (defined in
x≥0 g n (x) ≤ H n − 1.
Theorem 3. For n ≥ 2 bidders with exponentially i.i.d. valuations, the approximation ratio of anonymous pricing is at least
where function g n is defined in (1) . A plot of this lower bound can be seen in Fig. 2 
(red). In particular, the upper bound derived in the proof of Theorem 1 is tight (up to an exponentially vanishing additive factor).
Proof. Let X ∼ E be an exponential random variable. Then, we have
Putting the above together, we get the desired lower bound on the approximation ratio. For the tightness, we need to show that our lower bound is within an additive, exponentially decreasing factor of the upper bound given in (8) . Since the second term in (8) , it is enough to show that, for a sufficiently large number of bidders n,
This is exactly what we proved in Lemma 6, for any n ≥ 17. 
Explicit Prices -Knowledge of the Distribution
Our main result from Section 5 demonstrates that a seller, facing n bidders with i.i.d. valuations from and MHR distribution F , can achieve (asymptotically) optimal revenue by using just an anonymous, take-it-or-leave-it price. Taking a careful look within the proof of Theorem 1, we see that this upper bound is derived by comparing the optimal Myersonian revenue (via the bound provided by Lemma 1) to that of two different anonymous pricings; namely, first (see (4)) we use the monopoly reserve r * of F , and then (see (5) and (6)) a multiple of the expectation ν = E[X n−1:n ] of the second-highest order statistic of F , in particular c n · ν where
Although the latter price requires only the knowledge of ν = E[X n−1:n ], that is not the case for the former; determining the reserve price r * demands, in general, a detailed knowledge of the distribution F : it is the maximizer of r(1 − F (r)).
As a result, we would ideally like to provide a more robust solution, that would still provide optimality but depend only in limited information about F . If we pay even closer attention to the proof of Theorem 1, and the derivation of (9) in particular, we will see that the summand of our upper bound that corresponds to the pricing using r * is exponentially decreasing, according . Therefore, if we could show that the expected revenue achieved by using the other price c n ν is within a constant factor from that of using r * , then we could deduce that using only price c n ν has an insignificant effect on the approximation ratio of pricing. We do exactly that in the following lemma: 
where X ∼ F .
Proof. For convenience, denote µ = E[X] and ν = E[X n−1:n ]. By the proof of Theorem 1 (see (5) and (6)) we know that by offering an anonymous price of c n · ν gives us an expected revenue of at least
the second inequality holding due Lemma 5.
On the other hand, from (4) we know that using the reserve price r * as an anonymous price to all bidders gives an expected revenue of at most
the inequality holding due to Lemma 4. Putting everything together, we finally get that
The second inequality holds because
1−x is decreasing for x > 0 and q * ≥ 1/e (from Property 1 of Lemma 4). The last inequality is a consequence of Lemma 12 and the fact that H n ≤ ln(n) + 1.
As discussed before, Lemma 7 shows us that there indeed exists an anonymous price that depends on the knowledge of only the expectation of the second-order statistic of the valuation distribution and which, furthermore, guarantees an (asymptotically) optimal revenue. We can even provide a closed-form upper bound for it: Theorem 4. Let F be an MHR distribution and X n−1:n denote the second-highest, out of n i.i.d. draws from F . Then, using an anonymous price of c n · E[X n−1:n ], where c n is given in (10) , to sell an item to n ≥ 2 bidders with i.i.d. valuations from F , guarantees a revenue with approximation ratio of at most
A plot of this upper bound can be seen in Fig. 2 (blue) .
Proof. Simulating the proof of the approximation upper bound in Theorem 1, but now using (11) to approximate Price(F, n, r * ) by Price(F, n, c n E[X n−1:n ]), the derivation in (7) gives us that The first inequality is due to the fact that n ≥ 2 and ln(1/x) ≥ 0 and the last one due to x ≥ 1/e.
C Analytic Properties of Functions g n
Lemma (Lemma 6). Functions g n defined in (1) have a unique point of maximum ξ n ≡ argmax x≥0 g n (x). Furthermore, for all n ≥ 17,
Proof. Let n be a positive integer. First we compute the first and second derivatives of g n : g n (x) = 1 − 1 − e −x n 1 + n x e x − 1 (12) g n (x) = n (1 − e −x ) n [e x (x − 2) − nx + 2]
(e x − 1)
There is a unique point τ n > 0 on which function x → e x (x − 2) − nx + 2 changes sign from negative to positive, so the same holds for function g n ; thus, g n is strictly decreasing over (0, τ n ) and increasing over (τ n , ∞). Furthermore, notice that lim x→0 g n (x) = 1 and lim x→∞ g n (x) = 0. This means that there has to be a unique point ξ n > 0 (where ξ n < τ n ) at which g n changes sign from positive to negative. Therefore, ξ n is the unique global maximizer of g n .
In order to prove that a positive real y is above that maximization point, i.e., y ≥ ξ n , it is enough to show that function g n is decreasing at y, or equivalently, g n (y) < 0. So, recalling from Lemma 8 that H n − 1 > ln(n) + γ − 1, in order to complete our proof it is enough to show that g n (ln n + γ − 1) < 0 for all n ≥ 17.
We will do this by demonstrating that g n (ln n + γ − 1) is a decreasing sequence (with respect to n) that gets negative for n = 17. Using the explicit formula (12) for g n , we can see that (1))(H n − 1).
